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GRAPPLING WITH GRABLE IN SINGH V. DUANE MORRIS,
LLP: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR PRACTITIONERS
WHO LITIGATE STATE CAUSES OF ACTION WITH
EMBEDDED FEDERAL ISSUES
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Gary W. Thompson*
I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly a century ago, the Supreme Court, in Smith v. Kansas City Title
Co.,' held that state law causes of action with embedded federal issues may
"arise under" federal law if the embedded federal issue is substantial.2
Since Smith, the Court's holding has been subject to some trimming, and its
Smith holding is now embodied in a four-part analysis handed down by the
Court in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Man-
ufacturing.' The four-part analysis itself was an answer to a growing confu-
sion among the lower courts after the Court's prior decision in Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson,' which appeared to severely restrict
state causes of actions with embedded federal issues from arising under
federal law.
In Singh v. Duane Morris, LLP,5 the Fifth Circuit applied the Grable
four-part analysis for the first time and demonstrated with precession that
Grable has added substantial clarity to how federal courts should evaluate
state law claims with embedded federal issues and how and when they will
"arise under" federal law. Thus, in Singh, it appeared that the Fifth Circuit
had remanded the case under a straightforward analysis of Grable. How-
ever, the Fifth Circuit implicitly demonstrated a growing trend among the
circuit courts that an important factor to the Grable analysis is the charac-
ter of the federal issue, whether it is a question primarily of fact or law.
This Note argues that since Grable, determining the character of the
federal issue has become an important factor when applying Grable, not
only in the Fifth Circuit, but in other circuits as well. Part II of this Note
will examine the underlying facts in Singh that brought it to the thresh hold
of federal court. Part III provides a brief history of what it means for a
* 2009-2010 Executive Editor, Mississippi College Law Review, J.D. candidate, Mississippi
College School of Law; B.A. Boyce College. The author thanks his wife for her love, sacrifice, and
encouragement that made law school and writing this Note possible. The author also thanks Professor
Deborah Challener for her guidance and thoughtful feedback throughout this writing. Finally to my
father (1957-2008) and mother whose love and encouragement continues on still.
1. 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
2. Id. at 201-02.
3. 545 U.S. 308 (2005).
4. 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
5. 538 F.3d 334 (2008).
281
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
case to "arise under" federal law and how "arising under" jurisdiction
evolved to include state law causes of actions with embedded federal issues.
Part IV provides a detailed account of the Fifth Circuit's application of
Grable's four-part analysis in Singh, and Part V analyzes how the character
of the federal issues has become a crucial factor to the Grable analysis as
demonstrated by the Fifth Circuit and offers practical suggestions to practi-
tioners seeking exit or entry from the federal forum.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 30, 2008, Robin Singh ("Singh") initiated an action against the
law firm Duane Morris LLP and attorney Richard Redano ("Redano") for
malpractice. The alleged malpractice committed occurred in Redano's rep-
resentation of Singh during a federal trademark lawsuit6 with Test Masters
Educational Services that originated in 1999.'
In 1991, Singh began and operated a test preparation business under
the name "TestMasters" in Beverley Hills, California, and limited his ser-
vices to LSAT preparation.' Singh applied for federal registration of
"TestMasters" on June 23, 1995, with the Patent and Trademark Office
("PTO"), but was initially denied because three marks similar to Singh's
had already been registered.' Four years later, in March of 1999, the PTO
approved Singh's application once it was able to conclude that none of the
other three marks were still in use.10 Unknown to Singh, however, a simi-
lar businessn offering test preparation services started in Houston, Texas in
1991, operating under the name Test Masters Educational Services
("TES").12 The owner, Haku Israni, incorporated the business in 1994, and
made his son, Vivek Israni, its sole owner and president." Subsequently in
1995, months after Singh applied for federal registration of his trademark,
TES obtained rights to the domain name "testmasters.com."1 4 After Singh
had obtained trademark rights to TestMasters in 1999, he decided to create
his own website, but discovered TES had already obtained the rights to the
domain name "testmasters.com."15
Singh's attorney then sent a demand letter to TES claiming its use of
the domain name was an infringement on Singh's trademark rights and that
if TES did not relinquish the domain name then Singh would file suit.16
Anticipating litigation, TES filed suit in Texas federal district court seeking
6. Singh v. Duane Morris, LLP, 538 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 2008).





11. Whereas Singh's business only offered LSAT preparation at its inception, Test Masters Edu-
cational Services offered SAT, GMAT and MCAT preparation services, but not LSAT. Id. at 1.
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a declaration of non-infringement and asserted alternatively that Sing's
mark was invalid because it (1) was descriptive without secondary mean-
ing" and (2) that Singh had committed fraud on the PTO." Singh re-
sponded by filing a separate claim in Texas Federal district court asserting
that TES had infringed on his trademark and for unfair competition under
California law. TES answered Singh's complaint and raised the defense
that it was an innocent prior user of the TestMasters mark.'9 The suits
were consolidated and the district court granted summary judgment to
Singh on the fraud claim,20 reasoning that Singh "had no duty to update his
application with the PTO upon learning of certain others' use of similar
marks."2 1
"After a five-day trial, the jury found that Singh's mark was descrip-
tive but that it had acquired secondary meaning, and that TES had in-
fringed" on his trademark and "engaged in unfair competition through the
use of the domain name." 2 2 However, the jury also found that TES was an
innocent prior user and was therefore immune from liability.23 Following
the jury's finding, the district court "ordered the director of the PTO to
modify Singh's trademark registration to confer in TES the exclusive right
to use its mark within Texas." 24 "The district court also ordered TES to
transfer its ownership of testmasters.com to Singh." 25
Both parties appealed, and the Fifth Circuit reversed the district
court's denial of TES's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue
of secondary meaning, 26 holding that Singh had presented "little or no evi-
dence regarding secondary meaning." 27 Because the Court held that Singh
had failed to establish secondary meaning, it vacated the district court's
"judgment for Singh for unfair competition under California law and
RENDER[ed] for TES instead." 28 Additionally, the Fifth Circuit vacated
17. "In trademark law, designations are placed in categories in a spectrum of distinctiveness. If a
designation used as a mark is classified as not being "inherently distinctive," then to achieve trademark
status, that designation must be proven to have acquired distinctiveness as a mark in buyers' minds.
That status of acquired distinctiveness is called "secondary meaning." Secondary meaning is a new and
additional meaning that attaches to a non-inherently distinctive word or symbol. The public then uses
that word or symbol as a trademark or service mark to identify and distinguish a single commercial
source.
Thus, for a non-inherently distinctive trade symbol, such as a descriptive, geographic or personal name
designation, distinctiveness must be acquired in the marketplace in order to achieve the protectable
status of a trademark or service mark." 2 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair
Competition § 15:1 (4th ed.1992)




22. Id. During trial the district court had denied TES's motion for judgment as a matter of law on




26. Id. at 5.
27. Id. at 4.
28. Id. at 5.
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the district court's "order compelling TES to relinquish the disputed do-
main name." 29 Finally, the Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the district
court for entry of an order that Singh's trademark was invalid.3 0
After the Fifth Circuit's decision,"' Singh filed a Texas state law mal-
practice claim against his lawyer Redano in Texas state court, alleging that
Redano had failed "to introduce available evidence that would have suc-
cessfully established secondary meaning."3 2 Redano removed the suit to
federal district court basing federal jurisdiction on the argument "that the
outcome of the malpractice case depended on resolving questions of fed-
eral trademark law."3 3 The district court denied Singh's motion to remand
and concluded "that it had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
0§1331 and 1338(a) and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651."34 "The [dis-
trict] court held that collateral estoppel bared Singh's malpractice claims
and that Singh's claims [were] precluded by his failure to file a Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion with additional secondary meaning
evidence after the trademark trial had been concluded." 35 Therefore, "the
[district] court granted in part Redano's motion for summary judgment and
dismissed Singh's malpractice claims. "
Singh appealed the district court's denial of his motion to remand, and
on appeal the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's decision and ren-
dered judgment for dismissal for want of want of jurisdiction.3 7
III. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW
A. A Brief History of "Arising Under" Jurisdiction
The phrase "arising under" finds its origin in Article III of the U.S.
Constitution. Specifically, section two of Article III states: "The judicial
power shall extend to all Cases arising under this Constitution, the Laws of
the Unites States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority."3 9 Article III does not convey this power to the lower courts.
Section one of Article III, however, grants Congress the power to create
lower federal courts.4 0 Thus, Article III has been interpreted to require
Congress to define the jurisdictional limits of the lower courts.4 1 Although
29. Id.
30. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1119).
31. After the Fifth Circuit's ruling, Singh attempted to bring two additional suits to establish
secondary meaning. See Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding
Singh was precluded from re-litigating issues of secondary meaning); Singh Educ. Servs. Inc. v. Excel
Test Prep Inc., 274 Fed. Appx. 399 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (same).
32. Singh, 538 F.3d at 337.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 336.
35. Id. at 337.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 341.
38. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
39. Id. (emphasis added)
40. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
41. Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922).
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Congress created lower federal courts in the Judicial Act of 1789, it was not
until 187542 that Congress granted them the statutory power to hear cases
"arising under" federal law, using virtually the identical language of Article
III.43
Though Congress granted the lower courts "arising under" jurisdiction
that appeared identical to the jurisdiction available under the Constitution,
the statutory grant of "arising under" jurisdiction has traditionally been un-
derstood to be more limited in scope than its Constitutional counterpart.4 4
The Supreme Court's most notable endeavor to define the phrase "arising
under" in Article III was in Osborn v. Bank of the Unites States.4 5 In Os-
born, the Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether a federal
statute that established a Bank of the United States as a federal corpora-
tion and gave it the right to sue and be sued in any court of the Unites
States "arose under" federal law for purposes of Article III section two.46
The suit had originated in federal court because the Bank of the United
States initiated a suit against Osborn, the state tax collector, for unlawful
levying of certain taxes.4 7
The defendant argued, among other things, that the statute did not
give the Court jurisdiction and, alternatively, if it did it was unconstitu-
tional.4 8 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Marshall held that "when a
question to which the judicial power of the Union is extended by the con-
stitution, forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is in the power of
Congress to give the Circuit Courts Jurisdiction of that cause . ... "49 Thus,
Justice Marshall articulated the first test for federal question, or "arising
under" jurisdiction, under Article III. The Osborn case, 184 years later, is
still the controlling decision on the broad scope of Article III federal ques-
tion jurisdiction.o
In contrast to the Court's broad interpretation of "arising under" ju-
risdiction under Article III, the Court has narrowly interpreted the statute
that grants the lower courts "arising under" jurisdiction now codified at 28
42. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 ("That the circuit court of the United States
shall have original cognizance, concurrent with courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature
at common law or in equity. . .arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States or treaties made
.") (emphasis added).
43. To be historically accurate, The Judiciary Act of 1875 was not the first grant of "arising
under" power to the lower courts. There was a brief attempt to grant the broad range of "arising
under" power to the lower courts in 1801, known as the Midnight Judges Act by the outgoing Federal-
ist; however, this act was repealed by the incoming Jeffersonians. Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4 §11, 2 Stat.
89, 92, repealed by Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132, 132.
44. Donald L. Doernberg, There's No reason for it; It's Just our Policy: Why the Well-Pleaded rule
Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 38 HASTINGs L.J. 597, 598 (1987); see also
Metcalf v. City of Watertown, 128 U.S. 586 (1888) (holding the statutory provision is more narrow than
the constitutional provision).
45. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
46. Id. at 817.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 823 (emphasis added).
50. Doemberg, supra note 44, at 609. The Supreme Court's most recent reaffirmation of Osborn
is American National Red Cross v. S.G., 505 U.S. 247 (1992).
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U.S.C. § 1331.51 After the passing of the Judiciary Act of 1875, the Court
encountered its first dispute regarding the statutory phrase "arising under"
in Gold-Washing and Water Company v. Keyes, a case removed from state
court to federal court.53 The Court decided the case under Justice Mar-
shall's broad interpretation of the "arising under" language and equated
the phrase "arising under" in the statute with the phrase "arising under" in
Article III. Despite the broad interpretation given to the "arising under"
phrase, the Court held that the plaintiff in Gold-Washing failed to state
sufficient facts in the pleading that indicated the claim "arose under" fed-
eral law.54 Even though the court held that case did not "arise under" fed-
eral law, the holding does not stand for the proposition that the "arising
under" language in the statute should be interpreted more narrowly than
the constitutional provision." The Court held that the plaintiff in Gold-
Washing had simply not sufficiently stated any facts in the pleading that
demonstrated the case involved a federal issue." It was not until 1888 that
the less recognized opinion of Metcalf v. City of Watertown" forever
changed the landscape of federal question jurisdiction under the statutory
provision.
Metcalf was the Supreme Court's first articulation that for a case to
"arise under" under federal law, the plaintiffs complaint must show that
the suit depends upon construction of federal law." In Metcalf, the plain-
tiff brought an action in federal court to enforce a judgment that he had
received as an assignee from prior litigants against the City of Watertown, a
Municipal Corporation.60 The Court held that jurisdiction failed because
of its recent decision in Provident Saving Life Assurance Society v. Ford,6'
holding that a claim does not "arise under" federal law because the plaintiff
sues upon a judgment decided in federal court.62
The Court then went out of its way to articulate what is now known as
the well-pleaded complaint rule.6 3 In doing so, the Court noted that within
the case before it, a federal defense may have existed. However, it held
51. The Legislative History of the 1875 Act is minimal, but the little that does exist suggest that
Congress intended to grant the lower courts the full power of "arising under" jurisdiction. See, e.g., 2
Cong. Rec. 4986-87 (statement of Sen. Carpenter) ("[T]his bill gives precisely the power which the
constitution confers-nothing more, nothing less."); Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the
Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REv. 49 (1923); G. Merle Bergman, Reappraisal of Federal
Question Jurisdiction, 46 MICH. L. REV. 17, 17 (1947); Doernberg, supra note 44; David L. Shapiro,
Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U.L. REV. 543 (1985); Michael G. Collins, The Unhappy History of
Federal Question Removal, 71 IoWA L. REV. 717 (1986).
52. 96 U.S. 199 (1877).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 201-02.
55. Bergman, supra note 51, at 33-34.
56. Gold-Washing, 96 U.S. at 202.
57. 128 U.S. 586 (1888).
58. Collins, supra note 51, at 730-31.
59. Metcalf, 128 U.S. at 588-89 (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 586-87 (emphasis added).
61. 114 U.S. 635 (1885).
62. Metcalf, 128 U.S. at 588.
63. Id. at 587-89.
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that a federal defense would not be sufficient for the claim to "arise under"
federal law, because when the court had accepted such cases in the past,
those were removal cases and distinguishable from the present case, which
was brought under the lower court's original jurisdiction.' Without citing
to any authority, the court held that "it must appear, at the outset, from the
[complaint] of the party suing, that the suit is of that character. . . .," that of
"arising under" character.s
After Metcalf, the scope of statutory "arising under" jurisdiction con-
tinued to narrow and the well-pleaded complaint rule was then forever me-
morialized in Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company v. Mottley.6 6 The
Mottley's brought a contract action against the Louisville & Nashville Rail-
road for revoking their lifetime rail passes that the Railway gave as com-
pensation for injuries they sustained in a train accident.67 The complaint
alleged that the Railway did not renew the contract because of a new fed-
eral statute by Congress that forbade the giving of free passes or transpor-
tation on the railway.68 Neither party addressed the issue of the court's
subject matter jurisdiction and argued the case on its merits to the Supreme
Court.6 9 However, the Court, sua sponte, raised the issue of jurisdiction.70
Citing to Metcalf and a line of cases that came after it,71 the Court held that
for a suit to "arise under" under the Constitution or laws of the Unites
States, as that phrase was used in the predecessor to §1331, the "plaintiff's
statement of his own cause of action [must] show[] that it is based upon
those laws or that Constitution . . . [and not] some anticipated defense."7 2
Without even mentioning Mottley, Justice Holmes, writing for the ma-
jority in American Well Works Company v. Layne & Bowler Company,3
established the Supreme Court's first bright line test which appeared to go
beyond the Mottley holding. American Well Works brought an action
equivalent to a defamation claim because Lane & Bowler was telling the
business community that American had infringed its pump patent.74 The
Court held that American Well Works suit did not "arise under" federal
law because it did not properly involve issues of federal law; those issues
were only raised as defenses." Not satisfied to end his analysis that the
plaintiff had failed to state a claim that did not "arise under" under federal
law, Justice Holmes, in dictum, interpreted the "arising under" language to
64. Id. at 589.
65. Id.
66. 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
67. Id. at 150.
68. Id. at 151.
69. Id. at 152.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 154.
72. Mottley, 128 U.S. at 152.
73. 241 U.S. 257 (1916).
74. Id. at 258-59.
75. Id. at 259.
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mean that "[a] suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action,"76
now known as the Holmes creation test.
B. State Law Claims with Embedded Federal Issues "Arising Under"
Federal Law: A Look at Smith and Gully."
1. Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust
Decided in 1921, Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Company8 is re-
garded as the genesis of state-law claims with federal embedded federal
issues to come within federal question jurisdiction." In Smith, the plaintiff
brought a shareholders derivative action alleging that Kansas City Title &
Trust Company had exceeded its state authorized charter by investing in
unlawful bonds issued under the Federal Farm loan Act, an unconstitu-
tional statute,80 and therefore, the bonds were unconstitutional because
they were beyond the constitutional power of Congress and the trust com-
pany should be enjoined from investing in the bonds."'
Under American Well Works, Holmes's creation test, Smith's claim did
not "arise under" federal law because the law that created the cause of
action was Missouri state law." However, Justice Day, writing for the ma-
jority held:
[W]here it appears from the bill or statement of the plaintiff
that the right to relief depends upon the construction or ap-
plication of the Constitution or laws of the United States,
and that such federal claim is not merely colorable, and
rests upon a reasonable foundation, the District Court has
jurisdiction .8.. .3
The Court reasoned that the "controversy concern[ed] the constitu-
tional validity of an act of Congress which is directly drawn in question.
The decision [therefore] depend[ed] upon the [construction of federal
law]."84
76. Id. at 260.
77. Due to the focused nature of this Note on state law claims with embedded federal issues,
Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983), has been omitted. It is
important to note that Franchise Tax substantially dealt with the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act and
contributed to the to the discussion of state law claims with embedded federal issues by standing for the
proposition that the Smith decision was still recognized by the Supreme Court in 1983.
78. 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
79. Jason F. Presis, Jurisdiciton and Discretion in Hybrid Law Cases, 75 U. CIN. L. REv. 145, 153
(2006). Professor Presis refers to imbedded federal issues as "hybrid" claims, but it is the author's
position that such claims are better referred to as "federal issues embedded in state-law claims," which
is consistent with the Supreme Court's use of such claims "arising under." See Grable, 545 U.S. at 314.
80. Smith, 255 U.S. at 195.
81. Id. at 195-98.
82. Id. at 214 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 199.
84. Id. at 201.
[VOL. 29:281288
2010] GRAPPLING WITH GRABLE IN SINGH V. DUANE MORRIS 289
Justice Holmes dissented on the grounds that the claim was entirely
one of Missouri state law and created by Missouri state law." By not ac-
knowledging the Holmes test or even referring to Justices Holmes's pas-
sionate dissent in Smith, it appeared the Court was casting some doubt on
the significance of Justice Holmes's narrower bright line test for federal
question jurisdiction.8 6 Holmes's dissent was consistent with his opinion in
American Well Works written just five years earlier, which he noted only
one dissent.87
2. Gully v. First National Bank in Meridian
A decade later the Court rendered two out of three decisions in three
years consistent with American Well Works, but not with Smith.88  Of the
three decisions" most notable was Gully v. First National Bank in Merid-
ian.90 In Gully, the Mississippi state tax collector sued First National Bank
in Meridian in Mississippi state court to recover certain taxes the bank al-
legedly owed.91 The bank removed the case to federal court on the basis
that a federal statue enabled the state to bring the claim and its claim there-
fore "arose under" federal law. 92 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine if jurisdiction was valid.93
Justice Cardozo, most noted for his striking prose94 and less celebrated
for his contribution to the federal question jurisdiction puzzle, synthesized
the issues of arising under jurisdiction and its various tests. Under Car-
dozo's reading of the long history of arising under jurisdiction, the Court
85. Id. at 214 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
86. Doernberg, supra note 44, at 630.
87. Smith, 255 U.S. at 215 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
88. See generally Douglas D. McFarland, The True compass: No Federal Question in a State Law
Claim, 55 U. KAN. L. REv. 8, 10 (2006) (arguing that the three opinions listed in footnote 89, infra, are
all inconsistent with Smith and consistent with American Well Works); but see Richard D. Freer, Of
Rules and Standards: Reconciling Statutory Limitation on "Arising Under" Jurisdiction, 82 IND. L.J. 309,
327 (2007) (arguing that Gully applies the Holmes test from American Well Works and applies the
holding from Smith, concluding that Gully is not entirely inconsistent with Smith).
89. See Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476 (1933) (holding federal jurisdiction was not
proper simply because the plaintiff's right to sue was derived from federal law); Moore v. Chesapeake
& Ohio Ry., 291 U.S. 205 (1934) (holding state statute incorporating federal standard of duty with
exactness, did not raise a federal question); Gully v. First Nat'l Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109 (1936)
(holding that federal authority to sue under state law does not establish federal question jurisdiction).
90. Gully, 299 U.S. at 109.
91. Id. at 111.
92. Id. at 112.
93. Id.
94. Bergman, supra note 51, at 40 (stating "No other jurist in American history has delivered
himself with the clarity of thought and beauty of expression which habitually characterized the opinions
of Justice Cardozo. The confusion in the Gully case, I am satisfied, was not in the mind of the Justice,
but rather in the variegated reading which was bestowed upon it.").
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
concluded that a claim would "arise under" federal law if the right or im-
munity sued upon was created by the Constitution 9 5 or if the cause of ac-
tion contained an essential federal element, 96 and if the cause of action
satisfied the well-pleaded complaint rule.9 7
Cardozo, in synthesizing the various tests for jurisdiction, acknowl-
edged that the statutory provision for "arising under" jurisdiction was now
interpreted more narrowly than in the past and it is "the federal nature of
the right to be established [that] is decisive-not the source of the authority
to establish it."" The Court held that "[n]ot every question of federal law
emerging in a suit is proof that a federal law is the basis of the suit."99
In Gully, the Court explained that Mississippi contract law governed
the case and the federal enabling statute was not an issue presented for
adjudication.'o Noting the difficulty of establishing a bright line test or
adopting a test to anticipate future cases, Justice Cardozo observed:
"[w]hat is needed is something of that common-sense accommodation of
judgment to kaleidoscopic situations which characterizes the law in its
treatment of problems of causation . . . a selective process which picks the
substantial causes out of the web and lays the other ones aside."10
C. Confusing the Circuits: From Merrell Dow to Empire Healthchoice
1. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson10 2 was the seed that
spawned confusion and split the Courts of Appeals concerning when state
law claims with embedded federal issues satisfy "arising under" jurisdic-
tion. 03 In Merrell Dow, two plaintiffs brought separate Ohio state negli-
gence actions against Merrell Dow for negligently labeling its drug
Bendectine.104 Among the claims asserted, the plaintiffs alleged Merrell
Dow committed negligence because it allegedly violated the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act'05 (FDCA) by misbranding its drug.10 6 The plain-
tiffs alleged the violation created a "rebuttable presumption of negligence"
95. Gully, 299 U.S. at 112 (implying an endorsement of the Holmes test in American Well
Works).
96. Id. (implying an endorsement of Osborn as it applies to the Constitution and to the statute as
through the Smith analysis, which incorporated parts of the Osborn holding).
97. Id. (synthesizing the analysis with the well-pleaded complaint rule as articulated in Mottely).
98. Id. at 114 (quoting Puerto Rico, 288 U.S. at 483).
99. Id. at 115.
100. Id. 114-15.
101. Gully,299 U.S. at 117-18.
102. 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
103. See Id. at 824-25 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (critizing the majority for providing no basis of for
its conclusion). See also Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312
(granting certiorari to resolve a split within the Court of Appeals whether Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals Inc., v. Thompson always requires a federal cause of action as a condition for exercising federal
question jurisdiction).
104. Id. at 805.
105. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq.
106. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 805.
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and that the violation of the statute proximately caused the plaintiffs inju-
ries.107 Merrell Dow removed and the two cases were consolidated."os Re-
lying on Smith, jurisdiction was granted and the motion to remand was
denied.109
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed."o The Sixth Cir-
cuit held that the federal issue embedded in the state negligence claim,
violation of the FDCA, was not a substantial federal issue necessary to
decide the claim and noted "that the FDCA does not create or imply a
private right of action for individuals injured as a result of violation of the
Act.""' The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the Sixth
Circuit.' 12
The Court began with a brief history of the constitutional interpreta-
tion of arising under jurisdiction, citing to Osborn v. Bank of the United
States, and contrasted the statutory interpretation, noting that historically it
had been interpreted more narrowly.11 3 Citing to Mottley, the Court ex-
plained that under traditional interpretation, for a case to "arise under" the
statutory provision, the federal issue must be apparent from the "well-
pleaded complaint" and may not be asserted as a defense.'14 Likewise, the
Court noted that in cases of removal, jurisdiction must also be determined
from the "well-pleaded complaint.""'
The Court went on to reaffirm Smith by quoting Franchise Tax Board
v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust"6 for the proposition "that a case
may ["arise under"] federal law where the vindication of a right under state
law necessarily turn[s] on some construction of federal law."1 7 The Court
qualified this proposition by stating it should be read with caution, since
"the central issue" in Franchise Tax Board "turned on the meaning of Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974" (ERISA), but neverthe-
less found that jurisdiction was lacking."s The Court noted that the case
before it did not pose a question created by federal law and that the re-
spondents did not allege so, the Court quickly moved to determine if it the
case contained a state-created cause of action with an embedded federal
issue that "arose under" federal law.119




111. Id. at 806-07 (citing Franchise Tax Bd, 463 U.S. at 1 (1983) for the proposition that a state law
claim with an embedded federal issue, may arise under federal law, but noting that the federal issue
here was not substantial enough).
112. Id. at 807.
113. Id. at 807-08.
114. Id. at 808.
115. Id.
116. 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
117. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 808-09 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 9). The Court also
noted in footnote five that Smith v. Kansas City Title was most frequently cited for the proposition
quoted. Id. at 809.
118. Id. at 809.
119. Id. at 809-10.
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In undertaking its inquiry of the "outer reaches of § 1331," the Court
emphasized that such determinations "require sensitive judgments about
congressional intent, judicial power, and the federal system." 120 Most sig-
nificant to its judgment, the Court assumed the view of the Sixth Circuit
that there is no express cause of action in the FDCA for violations of the
statute, and noted that the parties agreed there was no implied cause of
action. For the purposes of its decision the Court assumed that this was the
correct interpretation. 121 The importance of this assumption could not be
overstated, because it provided a basis for the Court's interpretation of
whether the plaintiff's state law negligence claim based on violation of the
FDCA "arose under" federal law. 122
Merrell Dow advanced three arguments of why jurisdiction was
proper.12 3 First, Merrell Dow argued that under Franchise Tax Board that
jurisdiction is proper when "it appears that some substantial, disputed
question of federal law is a necessary element of the well-pleaded [com-
plaint]." 124 The Court responded to this argument by stating that the pro-
position stated in Franchise Tax Board "did not [ ]disturb the long-settled
understanding that mere presence of a federal issue . .. [will] not automati-
cally confer federal question jurisdiction." 125 The Court explained that the
language in Franchise Tax Board did not create an "automatic test," but
"recognized the need for careful judgment... in an area of uncertain juris-
diction."126 Because Congress excluded a private remedy, the Court rea-
soned that "the presence of a federal issue as an element [in a] state tort ...
[would not] serve congressional purposes [or] the federal system," and con-
cluded that "no federal remedy was ... tantamount to ... [being an] insuf-
ficiently 'substantial' [question] to confer federal-question jurisdiction." 2 7
Merrell Dow's second argument was "that there is a powerful federal
interest in seeing that the [FDCA] was given uniform interpretation[ ], and
that federal review was the best way of insuring such uniformity." 128 The
Court dismissed Merrell Dow's argument by reasoning that if uniformity is
what is needed, even if there is no original federal jurisdiction, the Su-
preme Court could decide the federal issue on appeal from the state
system.129
In its final argument, Merrell Dow argued that despite the general
rules of federal question jurisdiction, the case presented special circum-
stances that should lead the Court to find the claim "arose under" federal
120. Id. at 810.
121. Id. at 811. It is important to note that the Court was not making an actual determination that
there was not cause of action or an implied remedy for violation of the FDCA, as Justice Brennan
points out in his dissent.
122. Id. at 811-12.
123. Id. at 813.
124. Id. (quoting Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 13).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 814.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 815.
129. Id. at 816.
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law. 1 30 Merrell Dow advanced this argument on the basis that it was "un-
clear whether the FDCA applie[d] to sales in Canada and Scotland," and
this was a special reason for having the federal court answer the novel fed-
eral question pertaining to the Act.13 1 The Court quickly rejected this rea-
soning and concluded that the arising under jurisdiction, and inferably the
substantial nature of the federal issue, did not depend "on the novelty of
the federal issue."132
In dismissing all of Merrell Dow's arguments, the Court concluded
that a state law claim with an embedded federal issue does not state a cause
of action, "when Congress has determined that there should be no private,
federal cause of action for the violation, does not state a claim 'arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.'" 33
It would appear that Merrell Dow affirmed the Smith holding of em-
bedded federal issues in state-law claims, but added a new element - when
the imbedded federal issues provides no express or implied federal remedy,
jurisdiction will not be proper.134 This issue was the crux in Justice Bren-
nan's dissent."13  Brennan argued in his dissent that according to the major-
ity's reasoning, "if we assume that Congress did not intend that there be a
private federal cause of action under a particular federal law . . ., we must
also assume that Congress did not intend that there be federal jurisdiction
over a state cause of action that is determined by that federal law.""
Brennan argued that under Smith, as reaffirmed by Franchise Tax, jurisdic-
tion should lie.137 Thus, Brennan argued, and the future would prove true,
that it is not self evident that if Congress does not provide a federal remedy
in a statute that it suggests that Congress also did not want to extend fed-
eral jurisdiction to a state claim with an embedded federal issue based on
that statute.138
According to the dissent, jurisdiction was proper because it provided
an opportunity for uniformity of federal law, application of federal law by a
court with specialized knowledge in interpreting federal law, and the fur-
therance of congressional intent. Justice Brennan specifically criticized the
130. Id.
131. Id. at 816-17
132. Id. at 817.
133. Id. (quoting § 1331).
134. This conclusion is a bit conflicting, because if the premise above is true, then essentially
Merrell Dow would stand for the proposition of actually overruling Smith and replacing it with Ameri-
can Well Works. Nevertheless, this statement is drawn from the observation of the split in the Circuits
caused by Merrell Dow. It is important to note that Justice Brennan's Dissent does not see the holding
of the Court in Merrell Dow as overruling Smith, but misapplying it by looking for a private remedy in
the FDCA, and then determining that the federal issue was not substantial enough.
135. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 818.
136. Id. at 824.
137. Id. at 822-23.
138. Id. at 825-26.
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majority for failing to consider Congress's actual intent because its conclu-
sions were based on a faulty assumption of no implied remedy for violation
of the FDCA, which meant that jurisdiction should not be extended.13 9
2. Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering &
Manufacturing
Grablel4 0 was a quiet title action that originated in state court against
Darue.14 ' In 1994, the IRS seized real property of Grable's in order "to
satisfy a federal tax delinquency."14 2 Grable received notice of the seizure,
yet not in the manner prescribed by the statute, but did not exercise the
right to redeem the property. 14 3 Darue subsequently purchased the prop-
erty from the IRS.144 Grable's action claimed that Darue's title was invalid
because the IRS failed to give the proper statutory notice to Grable when it
seized its property and subsequently sold it.1.45 Darue removed to federal
court on the basis that "the claim of title depended on the interpretation of
the notice statute in the federal tax law."146 On a motion to remand, the
district court denied the motion finding there was subject matter jurisdic-
tion, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.147
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to clarify "whether
Merrell Dow [ ]always require[s] a federal cause of action as a condition for
exercising federal-question jurisdiction" in state-law claims with an embed-
ded federal issue.'48 Reaffirming the Sixth Circuit, the opinion consisted
mainly of two parts. The first dealt with the proper analysis of federal is-
sues embedded in state-law claims and the latter demonstrated how Merrell
Dow was not "contrary" to its holding in Grable.
The first part of the opinion began by acknowledging the traditional
standard for federal question jurisdiction and removal under the well-
pleaded complaint rule. The court additionally held that "another long-
standing, if less frequently encountered, variety of federal 'arising under'
jurisdiction, . . . [is] state-law claims that implicate[ ] significant federal is-
sues." 4 9 The Court stated that Smith is the classical example of this hold-
ing, though its "expansive" holding over the years had been subject to
"some trimming" by cases that recognized the validity of the doctrine.'
139. Id. at 826-30 (stating, "It bears emphasizing that the Court does not hold that there is no
private cause of action under the FDCA"); id. at 825, n.4; see also id. (stating "The Court nowhere
explains the basis of this conclusion. Yet it is hardly self-evident.").
140. Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc., v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg. 545 U.S. 308 (2005).
141. Id. at 308
142. Id. at 310.
143. Id. at 310-11.
144. Id. at 310.
145. Id. at 311.
146. Id.
147. Id. (reasoning that the "claim does not pose a 'significant question of federal law).
148. Id. at 311-12.
149. Id. at 312.
150. Id. at 313.
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The Court qualified its affirmation of Smith by noting that "even when
the state action discloses a contested and substantial federal question, the
exercise of federal jurisdiction is subject to a possible veto,""' because
"there must always be an assessment of any disruptive portent in exercising
federal jurisdiction."1 52 Thus, the Court provided that the proper analysis
of whether a state law claim with an imbedded federal issue "arises under"
federal law requires a determination of whether: "[1] [a] state-law claim
necessarily raises a stated federal issue, [2] actually disputed and [3] sub-
stantial, [4] which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any
congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial
responsibilities." 5 3
In applying its analysis, the Court determined that the federal issue -
the federal statute concerning notice - appeared to be the only issue in
dispute, satisfying the first two prongs of the Court's analysis that it must
be a federal issue and actually disputed.15 4 Concerning the third prong, the
Court reasoned that the federal issue in dispute, the interpretation of the
federal tax law, was substantial because its proper interpretation was one
that belonged in the federal court system, and that "[t]he Government
ha[d] a strong interest 'in the prompt and certain collection of delinquent
taxes.""5 5 Furthermore, the Court observed that the "Government ha[d] a
direct interest" in vindicating "its own administrative actions[ ] and buy-
ers," such as Darue, would "find it valuable to come before judges used to
federal tax matters." 156
As to the last prong, the Court reasoned the issue before it was a rare
type of state title claim that would raise an imbedded federal issue, and it
would only have a "microscopic effect on the federal-state division of la-
bor,"15 thus the rarity of such cases will prevent a disturbance of the fed-
eral-state distribution of labor.15 8
After clarifying the proper analysis of when state law claims with em-
bedded federal issues "arise under" federal law, the Court turned in its
opinion to demonstrate that its holding and conclusions were not inconsis-
tent with Merrell Dow, which appeared to be premised on the notion that
the imbedded federal issue needed to provide a private right of action to
"arise under" the federal law.
The Court explained that, read as a whole, Merrell Dow could not be
read as overturning Smith and adopting the Holmes creation test,1 5 9 and at
the end of Merrell Dow, Justice Holmes was still dissenting.1 60 To explain
151. Id. at 312-13.
152. Id. at 314.
153. Id. at 314.
154. Id. at 315.




159. Id. at 317.
160. Id. at 318.
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the Court's reliance on the absence of a private right of action in Merrell
Dow as justification for finding a lack of jurisdiction, the Court stated that
the lack of a private right of action was "evidence relevant to, but not dis-
positive of, the sensitive judgments about congressional intent that § 1331
requires."11 Thus, the Court explained further that the absence of a fed-
eral cause of action is to be considered in the "the assessment of substanti-
ality," of the federal issue but not dispositive. 162 The Court reasoned that
the missing cause of action was not the "missing federal door key" but the
"missing welcome mat" to the door for federal question jurisdiction.163
Absent a private right of action, combined with the implication that
allowing jurisdiction would have resulted in a "horde of original filing and
removal cases," left the Court to conclude that not finding jurisdiction in
Merrell Dow was justifiable.16 4 This led the Court to emphasize what it
thought important about Merrell Dow, though not clear from the face of
the opinion, that "if the federal labeling standard without a federal cause of
action could get a state claim into federal court, so could any other federal
standard without a federal cause of action. And that would have meant a
tremendous number of cases.""' The Court's conclusion here reconciled
its opinion in Merrell Dow with Grable by reasoning that the lack of federal
private right of action went to the substantiality of the federal issue of Mer-
rell Dow's claim, or lack thereof, and its implications of a possible flood of
state tort litigation proved a weak federal interest that could disturb the
federal-state division of labor.
3. Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh
Empire Healthchoice'66 brought a subrogation claim that originated in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
Empire Healthchoice Assurance, a local Blue Cross and Blue Shield com-
pany, was a contract carrier for the Office of Personnel Management
(OPM).1 67 The OPM is a governmental agency that was created by the
Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959 (FEHBA), which "autho-
rizes the [ ]OPM to contract with private [insurance] carriers to offer fed-
eral employees . . . health-care plans."16 8 As part of the contract
agreement between the OPM and the Blue Cross Blue Shield Association
(BCBSA), the BCBSA has an obligation "to make 'a reasonable effort' to
recoup amounts paid for medical care." 69
The Empire claim began "when an administrator of Plan beneficiary's
estate" sought tort damages in "state court against [an alleged tortfeasor





166. Empire Healthchoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677 (2006).
167. Id. at 682.
168. Id.; see 5 U.S.C. §§ 8901 et seq.
169. Empire Healthchoice Assur., Inc., 547 U.S. at 683.
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who had] caused the beneficiary's injuries. "170 The carrier was given notice
of the suit but took no part in the litigation.1 7 ' The tort action resulted in a
settlement over three million dollars and afterwards the carrier initiated
suit in federal court to recover medical expenses it had paid on behalf of
the beneficiary.17 2
The estate administrator, "McVeigh[,] moved to dismiss on various
grounds, [including] lack of subject-matter jurisdiction."" Empire argued
against McVeigh's motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
on two grounds: (1) the court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331
because "federal common law governed its reimbursement claim . . . [and
(2)] the Plan itself constituted federal law."174 The district court rejected
both of Empire's arguments and dismissed for want of subject-matter juris-
diction."1 7  The court of appeals subsequently affirmed.1 76 The Supreme
Court "granted certiorari . . . to resolve a conflict among lower federal
courts concerning the proper forum for claims of the kind Empire
assert[ed]."in
In its brief to the Supreme Court, Empire presented two arguments to
support federal-question jurisdiction: (1) its claim was a "federal claim be-
cause it [sought] to vindicate a contractual right contemplated by a federal
statute, a right that Congress intended to be federal in nature" and (2)
alternatively, if its claim arose under state law, federal-question jurisdiction
was proper under Grable.17 1 The Court affirmed and held there was no
federal-question jurisdiction. 17 9 In its opinion, the Court gave three rea-
sons why jurisdiction was not proper.1 so
First, the Court responded to the dissent and clarified that federal
common law did not govern the case before it.' 1 Second, the Court re-
jected Empire's first argument, which the Court believed was a variation of
the dissent's federal common law doctrine argument.18 2 Finally, the Court
briefly explained why the case before it did not satisfy the Grable analysis
to "arise under" federal law.' Due to the nature and scope of this Note,
and the complexity of federal common law, this Note will only evaluate the
Court's distinction between Empire Healthchoice and Grable.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 687.




177. Id. at 689.
178. Id. at 690.
179. Id. at 701
180. Id.
181. Id. at 692.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 699-701
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In its final argument, Empire proposed that even if its reimbursement
claim did not "qualify as a cause of action created by federal law, it never-
theless 'arose under' federal law for § 1331 purposes because federal law is
a necessary element of the carrier's claim for relief."'" The Court held
that this case did not "fit within the special and small category in which the
[litigants] would place it."ss The Court first noted that Grable, unlike Em-
pire, depended on the interpretation of a federal statutory provision.' 8 6
Furthermore, the Court stated that the resolution in Grable "was disposi-
tive of the case and would be controlling in numerous other cases.""87 In
contrast, the Court stated the issue in Empire Healthchoice primarily con-
cerned the "share of a settlement properly payable to Empire." 8 8
The Court furthered its distinction of the two cases on the grounds
that "Grable presented a nearly 'pure issue of law,' one 'that could be set-
tled once and for all and thereafter would govern numerous tax sale
cases."' 1 89 In contrast to its decision in Grable, the Court saw Empire's
claim as "fact-bound and situation-specific."'" In sum, the Court empha-
sized that its decision in Grable clearly established "that it takes more than
a federal element to 'open the arising under door"" 9'
IV. INSTANT CASE
Circuit Judge Jerry E. Smith delivered the opinion of the court in
Singh v. Duane Morris, LLP.,' 92 joined by Circuit Judges Dennis and
Reavley. Based primarily upon an analysis under Grable, the court vacated
the district court's grant of summary judgment and dismissed for want of
jurisdiction.'93
Because the Fifth Circuit was reviewing whether the district court's
assumption of federal jurisdiction was proper over a Texas legal malprac-
tice claim, the court began with a review of the requirements for a Texas
184. Id. at 699 (quoting Grabel, 545 U.S. at 312).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 700.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. (quoting HART AND WECHSLER'S, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 700
(5th ed. 2003)).
190. Id. at 701.
191. Id. at 701 (quoting Grable, 545 U.S. at 313) (emphasis added).
192. 538 F.3d 334 (2008).
193. Id. at 341. The Fifth Circuit also held that the suit failed to arise under federal law under the
All Writs Act. The district court had held that even if the federal issue in the claim was not substantial
enough to satisfy federal question jurisdiction that it would be satisfied under the All Writs Act. How-
ever, the Fifth Circuit held that the case lacked jurisdiction under the All Writs Act because the action
did not raise the "extraordinary circumstances" requirement of the Act. No attention is given to the
Courts analysis under the All Writs Act because the focus of this Note is the Court's treatment of
Grable.
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malpractice claim.194 The Court explained that under Texas law, the plain-
tiff "'[b]ears the burden to prove he would have prevailed on the underly-
ing cause of action . . . 'but for' the attorney's breach of duty.'"1' The
court made clear that this "suit within a suit" requirement is necessary to
prove the causation element of the malpractice claim.196 The court con-
cluded that Singh was required to prove that, but for Redano's breach of
attorney duty, he would have succeeded on his federal trademark claim. 197
To determine if Singh's malpractice claim contained an embedded fed-
eral issue that "arose under" federal law, the Fifth Circuit began its analysis
by quoting the traditional rule from Franchise Tax Board that "'federal
question [jurisdiction] exists 'only [in] those cases in which a well-pleaded
complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or
that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a sub-
stantial question of federal law.' "198 The court noted that Redano, in seek-
ing removal, "seized" on this language from Franchise Tax Board, but did
not heed the Supreme Court's subsequent warning that Franchise Tax
Board's "[n]ecssary-resolution language should be read as part of a care-
fully nuanced standard rather than a broad and simplistic rule." 199
The court then clarified that a state law claim with an embedded fed-
eral issue that is necessary for the case's resolution is not sufficient alone to
confer federal jurisdiction.20 The court explained that Franchise Tax
Board does not stand for the proposition of bestowing subject matter juris-
diction on state claims with the mere presence of a federal issue.20' In ad-
dition, using the language of the Supreme Court in Merrell Dow, the court
noted that Franchise Tax Board created "no 'automatic test'" 2 0 2 and
sounded caution about exercising "judicial power in an area of uncertain
jurisdiction." 203
Conceding the lack of availability of an "automatic test" for establish-
ing federal jurisdiction when a state claim depends upon the deciding of a
federal issue,20 4 the court then turned to the four-part analysis in Grable.205
In the court's words, Grable held that "federal question jurisdiction exists
where (1) resolving a federal issue is necessary to resolution of the state-
law claim; (2) the federal issue is actually disputed; (3) the federal issue is
194. Id. at 337.
195. Id. (quoting both Williams v. Briscoe, 137 S.W.3d 120, 124 (Tex. App. 2004); and Ballesteros
Jones, 985 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. App. 1998)).
196. Id. at 338.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 337-38 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 27-28).
199. Id. at 338. The opinion does not clarify where or when the Supreme Court had gave this
warning.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 338 (citing Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 813).
202. Id.
203. Id. (quoting Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814).
204. Id.
205. Id.
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substantial; and (4) federal jurisdiction will not disturb the balance of fed-
eral and state judicial responsibilities."20 6
Acknowledging that Singh's claim against Redano likely met the first
two elements, the court held that Redano had not demonstrated that the
federal issue was substantial or that federal jurisdiction would not disturb
the balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.2 0 7
A. Analysis of When a Federal Issue is Substantial
To interpret and clarify what a substantial federal issue is, the court
turned first to Merrell Dow for guidance.20 8 The Fifth Circuit interpreted
Merrell Dow as holding that, since Congress provided no private remedy
for the violation of the FDCA, the federal issue did not provide a substan-
tial federal interest.209 Comparing Singh to Merrell Dow, the Fifth Circuit
reasoned that Singh's malpractice claim made federal law only "tangen-
tially relevant" because the federal trademark statute provided no remedy
for injured clients to recover against deficient trademark attorneys and
malpractice claims were not relevant to the statute's objectives.21 0
The court also observed that Singh's claim did not contain a substan-
tial federal issue because it did not require the court to decide an important
issue of federal law.2 11 Here, the court contrasted Singh's claim with the
claim in Grable.2 12 The court explained that the federal issue in Grable was
substantial and jurisdiction was proper because the government had a
"'strong interest in the prompt and certain collection of delinquent
taxes.'" 2 13 Unlike the federal issue in Grable, the court reasoned that the
federal issue in Singh's action was "[p]redominately one of fact - whether
Singh had sufficient evidence that his trademark had acquired secondary
meaning."21 Thus, the majority concluded that Singh's claim did not raise
a substantial federal issue because the statutes governing trademarks did
not provide a remedy for malpractice claims and because the malpractice
claim did not require the resolution of an important question of federal
law. 215
206. Id. (citing Grable, 545 U.S. at 314, which said: "[T]he question is, does a state law claim
necessarily raise a state d federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may
entertain without disturbing a any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial
responsibilities.").
207. Id. at 338.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 338-39.
210. Id. at 339.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. (quoting Grable, 545 U.S. at 315.)
214. Id., n. 5 (stating that: "the issue on appeal was technically a legal question, insofar as the
court held that Singh's evidence of secondary meaning was insufficient as a matter of law. .. [however]
the question in Singh's malpractice case is primarily a question of fact: whether the evidence Redano
failed to present to the trial court would have resulted in a finding of secondary meaning." Test Masters
Educ. Servs., Inc., 46 Fed. Appx. At 227).
215. Id.
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B. Analysis of When Federal Jurisdiction would Disturb the Balance
of Federal and State Judicial Responsibilities
After determining that Singh's claim did not raise a substantial federal
issue, the Fifth Circuit turned to whether asserting federal jurisdiction over
the malpractice claim would "upend" the judicial responsibilities between
federal and state courts.21 6 The Court began its analysis of this element
with a caution from Grable, which warns that "'jurisdiction to hear a state-
law claim always raises the possibility of upsetting the state-federal line
drawn (or at least assumed) by Congress, ... [and] there must always be an
assessment of any disruptive portent in exercising federal jurisdiction.' "217
The court stated that malpractice claims had traditionally been the "do-
main" of the state courts218 and that "federal law rarely interferes with the
power of state authorities to regulate the practice of law." 2 19
Focusing on the greater implication of allowing federal jurisdiction
over a state malpractice claim, the court believed allowing jurisdiction had
the potential to "sweep innumerable state-law malpractice claims into fed-
eral court."2 20 Reading Merrell Dow and Grable together, the Fifth Circuit
reasoned that if the action could increase the volume of federal litigation in
the future, then jurisdiction would not likely be proper, 221 and that federal
jurisdiction should extend to rare cases that would have little effect of the
division of state and federal cases. 22 2
Because Texas malpractice claims require plaintiffs to prove they
would have succeeded on their claim but for the attorney's negligence, the
court believed that if it held jurisdiction proper in this case it would extend
federal jurisdiction to all litigants whose attorney's have allegedly commit-
ted malpractice while litigating a federal issue.223 With this belief, the
Court reasoned that asserting jurisdiction would "constitute a substantial
usurpation of state authority in an area in which states have traditionally
been dominant." 224
C. Declining to Follow the Federal Circuit
In its analysis of whether Singh's malpractice claim contained a sub-
stantial federal issue and whether it disturbed the balance between federal
and state courts, the Fifth Circuit declined to follow a recent decision of the
216. Id. Because Singh's claim did not contain a substantial federal issue, it is assumable that the
Court did not have to evaluate whether the claim would disturb the balance of federal and state courts.
217. Id. (quoting Grable, 545 U.S. at 314).
218. Id. (citing Custer v. Sweeney, 89 F.3d 1156, 1167 (4th Cir. 1996)).
219. Id.
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Federal Circuit that was factually similar."' In Air Measurement Technol-
ogy, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld,2 26 the Federal Circuit held
that a Texas malpractice claim did "arise under" federal law because the
"district court would have to hypothetically adjudicate a [patent] infringe-
ment claim." 2 27 The Federal Circuit subsequently found "simply no good
reason to deny federal jurisdiction. "228
In not following the Federal Circuit, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that Air
Measurement Technologies was not applicable because the Federal Circuit
had not considered whether there was a substantial federal issue or the
effect of federalism.2 29 In addition, the Fifth Circuit distinguished the case
before it from Air Measurement Technology because the malpractice action
in Air Measurement Technology concerned a patent suit and not a trade-
mark suit.23 0 Refraining from deciding if jurisdiction would extend if the
malpractice claim before it concerned a patent suit, the Court concluded
that jurisdiction did not extend to malpractice claims that involved only a
trademark issue.231
V. ANALYSIS
The decision in Singh implicitly23 2 demonstrates that a successful argu-
ment under the Grable four-part analysis2 3 3 hinges on the character of the
federal issue.234 The character of the federal issues is a growing trend
among the circuit courts in applying the Grable analysis. The character of
the federal issues is a law and fact distinction first made by HART AND
WECHSLER's, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 700 (5th
ed. 2003) as an attempt to reconcile Merrell Dow and Grable. This Su-
preme Court later endorsed the law and fact distinctior as one of many
reasons Empire Healthchoice did not "arise under" federal law. After the
Court's decision in Empire Healthchoice, the distinction was observed by
Professor Richard D. Freer2 3 5 as possibly effecting the shape of the lower
courts use of the Grable analysis, but, at that time, no court had seized
upon the distinction. Now it appears that Professor Freer's observations
225. Id.
226. 504 F.3d 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
227. Singh, 538 F.3d at 339 (quoting Air Measurement Tech, 504 F.3d at 1269).




232. The word "implicit" is used here because the Fifth Circuit does not expressly state that it is
making a law and fact distinction though, as will be shown, it appears to weave the distinction through-
out its analysis.
233. "[1] [a] state-law claim necessarily raises a stated federal issue, [2] actually disputed and [3]
substantial, [4]which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved
balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities." Grable, 545 U.S. at 314.
234. Adventure Outdoors, Inc. v. Bloomberg, 552 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2008) (reading Singh and
Air Measurements as consistent and distinguishable when evaluated by the contested federal issue in
those cases).
235. Richard D. Freer, Of Rules and Standards: Reconciling Statutory Limitation on "Arising
Under" Jurisdiction, 82 IND. L.J. 309, 328 (2007)
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were not only true but have been given full effect by the many of the cir-
cuits. The Grable analysis may at first seem to speak for itself, but as the
circuits and now the Fifth Circuit have applied it after Empire
Healthchoice, it may very well be saying Abundans cautela non nocet!236
As history has proven, applying Supreme Court precedent to state
causes of action with embedded federal issues to "pick[] the substantial
causes out of the web and lay the other ones aside" 237 can sometimes be
difficult. Often, identifying parts one and two of the Court's Grable analy-
sis may appear simplistic. However, determining whether the federal issue
is substantial and whether granting jurisdiction will disturb the congressio-
nally-approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities has
proven more difficult for litigants and courts since Empire Healthchoice.2 38
This Note argues, that the last two parts of Grable's analysis can now best
be understood and applied by examining the character of the federal issue,
whether the embedded federal issue is a question of fact or law, to deter-
mine whether it is substantial and whether it will disturb the balance of
federal and state judicial responsibilities.
This analysis will first discuss Empire Healthchoice distinction and the
effects it has had on the Court's Grable analysis as demonstrated by the
circuit courts. Second, this analysis will discuss how a narrow exception to
this growing trend has developed as demonstrated by the Federal Circuit.
Third, this analysis will argue how the Fifth Circuit has joined the growing
trend of focusing on the federal character of state causes of action with
embedded federal issues. Finally, this Note will attempt to offer practical
suggestions to practitioners seeking exit or entry from federal court when
dealing with a state cause of action with an embedded federal issue.
A. Seizing on the Empire Heathchoice Distinction
After Merrell Dow split the circuit courts, the Court decided Grable in
order to "clarify" the confusion caused in the lower courts about state law
causes of action with embedded federal issues.239 In contrast, the Supreme
Court decided Empire Healthchoice to clarify the proper forum for claims
by carriers contracted by the OPM.24 0
The sole issues presented to the Supreme Court in Empire
Healthchoice concerned federal jurisdiction.24 1 However, when the Court
considered Empire's second argument of whether jurisdiction was proper
under Grable, it chose not to mention its four-part analysis given just one
year earlier in Grable.2 42 Instead, the Court centered on the distinction
236. Latin for "Abundant caution does not harm."
237. Gully, 299 U.S. at 117-18.
238. See, e.g., Adventure Outdoor, Inc., 552 F.3d at 1290; Singh, 538 F.3d at 334. But see Air Mea-
surement Tech., 504 F.3d at 1262.
239. Grable, 545 U.S. at 311.
240. Empire Healthchoice Assur. Inc., 547 U.S. at 689.
241. Id. at 683.
242. Id. at 698-701. The Court did mention the fourth part of its analysis, but only in passing when
addressing an argument present by United States in its Amicus Curiae brief. See id. at 701.
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that Grable presented "a nearly pure issue of law," whereas the issue in
Empire Healthchoice was a "fact-bound and situation specific." 24 3
Since the Court's Empire Healthchoice decision, many circuits and dis-
trict courts have seized on this distinction when applying the Grable analy-
sis to state causes of action with embedded federal issues.2 44 The Seventh
Circuit was the first to use the Empire Healthchoice distinction, in Bennett
v. Southwest Airlines Co.,245 when it stated: "What the Court said about
Grable in Empire Healthchoice can be said here too. We have a fact-spe-
cific application of rules that come from both federal and state law rather
than a context-free inquiry into the meaning of a federal law." 2 4 6 Just as
the Supreme Court chose not to reference the Grable four-part analysis in
its Empire Healthchoice decision, the Seventh Circuit also dismissed the
litigants Grable argument without even looking at or mentioning the Gra-
ble analysis. Thus, the Seventh Circuit, and now many other courts, appear
to have added an element to the Grable analysis of determining whether a
state cause of action with an embedded federal issue is properly before the
court. This additional element includes determining whether the federal
issue(s) can be characterized as questions of law or fact.
This Note does not contend that the Grable analysis is irrelevant to
determine whether a state cause of action with an embedded federal issue
should "arise under" federal law. It is, however, the position of this Note
that the Supreme Court has added a clarifying distinction to its Grable
analysis that has appeared to go seemingly unnoticed by commentators and
until recently by the courts - the character of the federal issue, whether the
federal issue is a question of law or fact.247
The Eleventh Circuit, in Adventure Outdoor Inc., v. Bloomberg,2 48 ap-
plied this distinction more recently. In Adventure Outdoor, the court eval-
uated the litigant's state law claim with embedded federal issues under the
Grable's four-part analysis. 2 4 9 However, the court determined that the fed-
eral issue[s] in the state law claim were not "substantial" because they were
not "nearly pure issues of law." 25 0
Unlike the Seventh Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit applied the Grable
analysis, but qualified the "substantial" element as one that needed to be an
issue of federal law that required constructing and not one of fact that may
243. Id. at 701 (internal quotations omitted).
244. See, e.g., Mikulski v. Centerior Energy Corp., 501F.3d 555, 568 (6th Cir. 2007); Blue Cross
Blue Shield of Ill. v. Cruz, 495 F.3d 510, 511 (7th Cir. 2007); Adventure Outdoors, Inc. v. Bloomberg,
552 F.3d 1290, 1296 (11th Cir. 2008); Century Tel of Fairwater-Brandon-Alto, LLC v. Charter Fiberlink,
LLC, 588 F. Supp. 2d 968, 973 (W.D. Wis. 2008).
245. 484 F.3d 907 (7th Cir. 2007).
246. Id. at 910.
247. As mentioned before this distinction of looking to the character of the federal issue has been
observed, but not as it has been applied by the lower courts since the Supreme Court's holding in
Empire Healthchoice. See Freer, supra note 88, at 336.
248. Adventure Outdoor, Inc., 552 F.3d 1290.
249. Id. at 1296.
250. Id. at 1299.
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require the application of federal law. 251 The court then went on to cite
Bennett and Empire Healthchoice and noted that Supreme Court precedent
and the law of its sister courts "placed a strong, if not dispositive, emphasis
on the character of the disputed federal issue in evaluating the propriety of
the substantial federal question jurisdiction." 25 2 The Eleventh Circuit
seemed to undermine its own statement by latter citing Air Measurement,
and stating that it was not holding that "only pure legal issues can trigger
substantial federal question jurisdiction, but rather. . . provide[s] the
strongest basis [for federal question jurisdiction] ....
Reading the Eleventh and Seventh Circuit together leaves the ob-
server with the understanding that the character of the federal issue,
whether used in conjunction with the Grable analysis or not, has become a
deciding factor in determining whether a state cause of action with an em-
bedded federal issue will "arise under" federal law.25 4 However, the Elev-
enth Circuit appears to leave open the possibility that some state causes of
action with embedded federal issues may meet the substantiality require-
ment even if they are not pure issues of federal law.
B. An Exception to the General Trend
Air Measurement is a recent decision by the Federal Circuit that ap-
pears to be an example of a state cause of action with an embedded federal
issue that did not require construction of nearly pure issues of law that met
the substantiality and federalism requirements of the Grable analysis.2 55 In
addition, Air Measurement illustrates why deciding pure issues of law
should not be completely dispositive when determining whether to grant
federal jurisdiction to state causes of action with embedded federal issues.
However, Air Measurement may also show that it is a rare exception when
the character of the federal issue will not decide the fate of such claims.
This exception is best demonstrated by juxtaposing Air Measurement
against Singh.
At first glance Singh and Air Measurement appear inconsistent, as
both were almost exactly factually similar, but ended with different results.
Both Singh and Air Measurement dealt with Texas malpractice claims that
required the original suit be proven to establish the malpractice claim. The
primary distinction, as the Singh court pointed out, was that Singh's mal-
practice claim involved proving a trademark issues, whereas Air Measure-
ment involved a patent issue. 2 5 6 The Fifth Circuit attempted to distinguish
251. Id.
252. Id. In using the words "substantial federal question jurisdiction" the court is referring to state
law claims with embedded federal issues that arise under federal law.
253. Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
254. Currently, not all of the circuits have had the opportunity to take a position if the character
of the federal issue will be a deciding factor in their Grable analysis. At this time it is unclear whether
the other circuits will decided the issues similarly.
255. Air Measurement, 504 F.3d at 1262; see Adventure Ooutdoors, 552 F.3d at 1299 (noting the
Air Measurement case as a possible exception to the Empire Healthchoice distinction).
256. Singh, 538 F.3d at 340.
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Singh from the Federal Circuit's decision in Air Measurement, on the basis
that the Federal Circuit did not "consider" the "federal interest and the
effect on federalism." 2 57 However, the Fifth Circuit's second distinction,
failure to consider the Grable analysis as it had done, is misleading because
both courts unmistakably decided the cases before it applying the four-part
analysis established by Grable, except that the Fifth Circuit also considered
whether the federal issue was one of fact or law.25 8
The primary, if not only, distinction in Air Measurement was in fact the
issue of patent law lurking in the malpractice claim. In explaining why the
case before it "arose under" federal jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit
pointed out that "Grable did not hold that only state law claims that in-
volve constructions of federal statute or pure questions of law belonged in
federal court. Instead the holding was based on the substantiality and fed-
eralism factors . . . ." of the federal issue.2 59 The Federal Circuit then rea-
soned that its decision was distinguishable from Empire Healthchoice
because its case passed the substantiality and federalism aspects of the Gra-
ble analysis, whereas Empire Healthchoice did not.26 0
The Federal Circuit believed that the state cause of action with the
embedded patent issue in Air Measurement met the latter two aspects of
the Grable analysis because: 1) "patents are issued by a federal agency;" 2)
"litigants [would] benefit from federal judges who have experience in claim
construction and infringement matters"; and 3) Congress considered the
federal-state division of labor in 28 U.S.C. § 1338 which provides exclusive
jurisdiction to federal courts in patent cases and struck a balance in favor of
the federal courts.261
Had the Federal Circuit followed the general trend of the Empire
Healthchoice distinction, it may have concluded without qualification, that
a pure issue of federal law is dispositive in finding federal jurisdiction in
state law claims with embedded federal issues. Furthermore, to have held
contrary to its decision would have placed the federal issue of patent law,
which federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over, in the hands of state
courts. Despite being an exception to the general trend of the Empire
Healthchoice distinction, Air Measurement does not appear to swing open
the door for litigants seeking entry into federal court, but demonstrates a
narrow exception of characterizing the federal issue when the embedded
federal issues is one that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction.
257. Id.
258. See Air Measurement, 504 F.3d at 1272-73 (applying the Grable analysis to the case before it).
259. Id. at 1272.
260. Id. at 1273.
261. Id. at 1272.
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C. The Fifth Circuit: Jumping on Empire Healthchoice's Wagon or Not?
Unlike its sister circuits, the Fifth Circuit has joined the bandwagon of
making the law and fact distinction without expressly stating so. 2 6 2 At first
glance it would appear that the Fifth Circuit has not joined in using the law
and fact distinction to determine whether state law claims with embedded
federal issues "arise under" federal law since it did not reference Empire
Healthchoice in its opinion. However, the Fifth Circuit weaves the distinc-
tion throughout its analysis in the Singh opinion.
In Singh, the Fifth Circuit noted that due to the lack of a "pellucid"
test for determining federal jurisdiction over state causes of action with
embedded federal issues Grable provided the appropriate analysis to deter-
mine whether jurisdiction existed.2 6 3 The court interpreted Grable as pro-
viding a four-part balancing test and assumed that the case before it
satisfied the first two parts of the test. The court stated the issues before it
was whether or not the latter two parts of the analysis could be fulfilled -
whether the federal issue was substantial and if federal jurisdiction would
disturb the balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities. 264 The
Fifth Circuit held they were not.265
The court first joined its sister circuits in making the law and fact dis-
tinction with the most unsuspecting bedfellow, Merrell Dow. The Fifth Cir-
cuit utilized Merrell Dow to evaluate as one factor among many, the
substantiality of the federal issue in Singh by determining if Congress had
provided for a private remedy. According to the court, demonstrating a
private right of action in the trademark statute would strengthen the argu-
ment that the federal interest in the Singh suit was strong.2 6 6 Here, the
Fifth Circuit pointed out in a footnote that the federal interest was weak
because of the nature of the federal issue;267 that is, whether it was one of
fact or law, implying to the reader that the "nature" of the federal issue was
substantive to determine whether the embedded federal issue is
substantive.
Next, the Fifth Circuit joined in the law and fact distinction by con-
trasting Grable and Singh. The Fifth Circuit discussed how the federal is-
sue in Grable was predominately one of law and not of fact, whereas the
federal issue in Singh was predominately one of fact.268 Yet, the Fifth Cir-
cuit failed to fully explain why this was an important distinction as other
circuits had done by citing to Empire Healthchoice. Thus, it appears that
the Fifth Circuit interprets Grable as clearly making the important law and
fact distinction and found no need to reference Empire Healthchoice. That
is, a state cause of action with an embedded federal issue will not meet the
262. Singh, 538 F.3d at 339. The Fifth Circuit seized on the Empire Healthchoice distinction, but
as will be explained, chose not to cite to Empire Healthchoice in its analysis.
263. Id. at 338.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 339.
267. Id. at n.4.
268. Id. at 339.
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substantiality requirement if the federal issue is primarily a question of fact
and not one of law.
Because the Fifth Circuit found the federal issues in Singh's case to be
insubstantial, the court also reasoned that to find jurisdiction would "upend
the balance between federal and state judicial responsibilities."26 9 This rea-
soning is consistent with Grable and Empire Healthchoice because essen-
tially for the court to have held otherwise would have allowed a tort claim
into federal court that traditionally belonged in state court. Yet to stop the
analysis here would appear to have placed the Fifth Circuit in stark con-
trast with the Federal Circuit, thus the Fifth Circuit attempted to distin-
guish itself from the Federal Circuit's decision in Air Measurement.270
The Fifth Circuit declined to follow the Federal Circuit on the assump-
tion that the Federal Circuit had failed to consider the issues of substantial-
ity and federalism as it did, and because the federal issue in Air
Measurement dealt with a patent issue and not trademark. More appropri-
ately, the Fifth Circuit should have noted that it decided not to follow the
Federal Circuit because in considering the same analysis as the Federal Cir-
cuit, it reached a different conclusion because of the federal issue involved
in each case respectively.271 However, in Air Measurement federal jurisdic-
tion was not upheld because the patent issue was more substantial as com-
pared to a trademark issue. When read in context, the federal issue in Air
Measurement allowed for federal jurisdiction because the patent issue
tipped the scale under the federalism analysis. That is, the patent issue
provided an exception to the growing popularity of the Empire
Healthchoice distinction because such cases would rarely come into federal
court.
Because the Fifth Circuit does not mention or refer to Empire
Healthchoice in Singh, it may raise doubt as to whether it has joined its
sister circuits in making the law and fact distinction in. However, because
of its emphasis of the lack of a substantial federal issue based on the rea-
soning that the federal issue was predominately one of fact and not law,
aligns the Fifth Circuit with its sister circuits that agrees with law and fact
distinction.
D. Exit or Entry: Practical Suggestion for Practitioners Litigating State
Causes of Action with Embedded Federal Issues
Whether the law and fact distinction is the correct interpretation of the
precedent handed down by Supreme Court is not the focus of this Note.
What is important to the purpose of this Note is how the Fifth Circuit and
its sister circuits have dealt with the distinction and the implications this has
on the practitioner. To many, being able to select a state or federal forum
may be considered an advantage or disadvantage. After Grable, seeking
269. Id.
270. Id. at 340.
271. Id. (noting that the federal interest in the patent case may have been more substantial).
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the forum advantage appeared to be become clearer to evaluate; however,
as this Note has observed, applying Grable to determine whether a state
cause of action with an embedded federal issue "arises under" federal law
requires making the distinction that the federal issue is not only substantial,
but primarily one of law and not fact. The following discussion provides a
four-step analysis modeled after Grable that considers the law and fact dis-
tinction in the latter two parts of the analysis.
1. Is There a Federal Issue?
Regardless if the litigator is seeking entry or exit from the federal fo-
rum, when the case is a state cause of action with an embedded federal
issue, the first question that should be posed: Is there a federal issue in-
volved on the face of the complaint? This question may seem trivial, if not
trite, to the experienced practitioner. However, as demonstrated recently
by Willams v. Viva Health Inc.,272 this question may not be as easy as it
appears. In Williams, the defendant's argument that the state cause of ac-
tion required the decision of an embedded federal issue failed because the
court viewed the federal issue as a defense and not a federal issue actually
present in the case.273 This is important because it is a stark reminder of
the court's strict adherence to the well-pleaded complaint rule.
2. Is the Federal Issue Actually Disputed?
Determining if the federal issue is actually disputed is the second step
of the Grable analysis, and again somewhat obvious. Maybe somewhat less
obvious is that it is the first step in applying the fact or law distinction. In
cases such as Smith and Grable, determining if the federal issue was dis-
puted was easy because it was the only question present for adjudication
and required interpretation of federal law; whereas, "[in] Merrell Dow, it
was not clear [if] the federal issue would arise [because] the case could
have been litigated without deciding the FDCA question."274 This is an
important observation because when assessing the litigation, if the case is
like Smith or Grable then it is more likely that the case will require the
decision of federal law rather than present a fact bound situation as
presented in Merrell Dow. Though not dispositive,2 7 5 evaluating whether
the federal issue embedded in the state law claim is one of fact or law may
help the court to determine whether the federal issue is actually disputed.
However, as demonstrated by Singh the federal issue may actually be dis-
puted, but nonetheless fail the substantiality requirement.
272. 2008 WL 220799 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 25, 2008).
273. Id. at *5.
274. Freer, supra note 88, at 336.
275. In Singh the Fifth Circuit concluded that the federal issue was more of a fact-bound question
than one of law, but for purposes of its decision assumed that the first two elements of the Grable
analysis had been met. This note only suggest that demonstrating to the court that the argument is
more of one of law than of fact will only serve to strengthen the claim that the federal issue is actually
disputed.
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3. Is the Federal Issue Substantial?
Typically, determining if the federal issue is substantial is the most dif-
ficult aspect of the Grable analysis, especially since the Court's decision in
Empire Healthchoice.27 6 Since Empire Healthchoice, determining if the
federal issue is substantial seems best answered by evaluating whether the
court will be called upon to adjudicate a federal question of law or fact.
That is, would the court be interpreting federal law or simply applying it to
a fact-bound situation in an area of well-settled law? Answering this ques-
tion first operates as a guide to answering the Court's traditional question
for substantiality, whether the federal issue that is present presents a "seri-
ous federal interest in claiming the advantages thought to be inherent in a
federal forum." 277
By a review of the decisions of the Court, questions of law are one in
which the litigant would want to "resort to the experience, solicitude, and
hope of uniformity that a federal forum offers on federal issues." 278 While
"federal question jurisdiction exists to provide a federal forum for the con-
struction or application of federal law,"279 it has been suggested and the
courts have now demonstrated that the "task of construction is more im-
portant than the task of application in cases involving state-law claims." 28 0
Even before Empire Healthchoice, the Court has been steadily estab-
lishing a record that reflects questions of law, rather than questions of fact,
are more likely to "arise under" federal law, even when the Court has not
expressly held so. Thus, the Court's track record can be traced as such:
Law
Creating Law to be Question of Arise
Case Action Interpreted Law or Fact Under
Smith State Federal Law Yes
Merrell Dow State Federal Fact No
Grable State Federal Law Yes
Empire Healthchoice State Federal Fact No
After focusing on whether the federal issue requires the construction
or application of fact-bound specific situation, it is easier to determine the
importance of the federal issue in question; that is, whether there is strong
federal interest in seeing it litigated in federal court. As demonstrated by
Merrell Dow, Grable, and Empire Healthchoice state causes of actions with
embedded federal issues that require questions of law to be decided will: 1)
276. See, e.g., Mikulski v. Centerior Energy Corp., 501 F.3d 555 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that an
allegation that defendants violated Internal Revenue Code accounting provision, in relation to civil suit,
did not arise under federal jurisdiction).
277. Grable, 545 U.S. at 313.
278. Id. at 312.
279. Freer, supra note 88, at 337 (internal quotations omitted).
280. Id.
[VOL. 29:281310
2010] GRAPPLING WITH GRABLE IN SINGH V. DUANE MORRIS 311
involve the construction of the federal law in question; 2) set precedent
concerning the federal issue; and 3) arise in rare situations.281
4. Will Federal and State Judicial Responsibilities be Disturbed?
"[E]ven when the state action discloses a contested and substantial
federal question, the exercise of federal jurisdiction is subject to a possible
veto [by the court]."282 Even in light of the dispositive character of the
Empire Healthchoice distinction, this last factor prevents the Court from
"stating a 'single, precise, all-embracing' test for jurisdiction over federal
issues embedded in state-law claims . . . ."283 In fact, Air Measurement
demonstrates that the last factor in the analysis may be enough to tip the
scales in favor of jurisdiction, when the federal issue is not substantial be-
cause it does not require the construction of federal law as explained by
Empire Healthchoice. Here the courts will seek to evaluate the frequency
with which the state-law claim with the federal issue will likely come before
it. When preparing for litigation, the court must determine how granting
jurisdiction will affect the division of labor between state and federal
courts. Also, as pointed out by Empire Healthchoice, if the federal issue
involved is a statute, did Congress give any indication as to its desire to see
the issue litigated in federal court?
The Federal Circuit viewed patent issues embedded in state malprac-
tice claims as having a microscopic effect on the division of state and fed-
eral labor as Grable's quiet title action. However, as the Fifth Circuit held
in Singh re-litigating a suit within a suit that involved a trademark issue,
was not the sort of situation Congress had in mind that would require the
case to "arise under" federal jurisdiction because Congress had made al-
lowance for trademark cases to be litigate in state court. Thus, the Fifth
Circuit rightly observed to grant federal jurisdiction in Singh would have
set precedent in the Fifth Circuit that any malpractice claim that involved a
federal issue would "arise under" federal jurisdiction.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since Smith, the Court has continually narrowed its holdings of when a
state cause of action with an embedded federal issue may "arise under"
federal law. One goal the Court has continually reaffirmed since the begin-
ning of this narrowing is to control the flood of litigation that may occur by
allowing such cases to "arise under" federal law.
The litigator should be keenly aware of the character of the federal
issue that he or she is litigating. In addition to the Supreme Court's Grable
analysis, the courts have placed considerable emphasis on the character of
the federal issue. This emphasis may be read as a further narrowing of
Grable, or a clearer explanation of the Court's analysis in Grable of what it
281. See Grable, 545 U.S. at 312-16.
282. Id. at 313.
283. Id. at 314 (internal quotations omitted).
312 MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW [VOL. 29:281
means for a federal issue to be substantial and whether that issue will dis-
turb any federalism concerns. Regardless of how the law and fact distinc-
tion is evaluated, it appears the distinction must now be considered.
Understanding the character of the federal issue may further what
seems to be one of the primary goals of the Court - controlling the federal
docket, and a strict adherence to its arising under standard. By under-
standing these goals as advanced by the courts in evaluating the character
of the federal issue, practitioners may be more equipped to anticipate
whether their state causes of action with embedded federal issues will
"arise under" federal law and whether it will be worth the time and ex-
pense of the client to seek entry or exit from the federal forum.
